Impact of the Dividend Policy and Related Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Agency Costs

The paper's primary goal is to identify the role of the dividend policy and related corporate governance mechanisms in reducing agency problem between management (agent) or large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (principal). Another important goal of the research paper is approximating the agency costs. The turnover coefficient of total assets approximates this measure for the work. The agency costs are specific for joint-stock companies, and it results from the agency problem (when agents do not represent the best interests of principals), and it is not possible to measure it directly. Namely, the agency costs and the possibility of their reduction are linked to the legal protection of investors (principals) and the specifics of the joint-stock company's. Therefore, additional knowledge is essential in solving the agency problem in the insufficiently researched developing countries. Based on the results of the empirical research carried out as part of this paper, the significant role of dividend policy in explaining changes in the agency costs has been confirmed, which is in line with the majority of research carried out so far.