Multi-Fleet Platoon Matching: A Game-Theoretic Approach

We consider the platoon matching problem for a set of trucks with the same\norigin, but different destinations. It is assumed that the vehicles benefit\nfrom traveling in a platoon for instance through reduced fuel consumption. The\nvehicles belong to different fleet owners and their strategic interaction is\nmodeled as a non-cooperative game where the vehicle actions are their departure\ntimes. Each truck has a preferred departure time and its utility function is\ndefined as the difference between its benefit from platooning and the cost of\ndeviating from its preferred departure time. We show that the platoon matching\ngame is an exact potential game. An algorithm based on best response dynamics\nis proposed for finding a Nash equilibrium of the game. At a Nash equilibrium,\nvehicles with the same departure time are matched to form a platoon. Finally,\nthe total fuel reduction at the Nash equilibrium is studied and compared with\nthat of a cooperative matching solution where a common utility function for all\nvehicles is optimized.\n