Service configuration and demand information sharing in a hybrid tourism platform supply chain

Purpose This study investigates the interaction between service configuration and the demand information sharing mechanism in the context of a hybrid tourism platform supply chain under culture–tourism integration. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, a supply chain that includes a tourism service provider and a tourism platform is constructed, in which context both parties engage in hybrid sales through agency and wholesale channels. Using a dynamic game approach, the equilibrium strategies for service configuration and demand information sharing are derived. Findings The results of this research reveal that under the service provider configuration strategy, the platform shares information; under the platform configuration strategy, it shares demand information only when the commission rate is moderate. Moreover, the platform always prefers the service provider configuration strategy. Interestingly, the service provider is incentivized to bear service investment costs even under conditions involving a high commission rate. Under certain conditions, when the information advantage resulting from the service configuration fails to offset cost pressure, an “information advantage trap” emerges, thus leading the service provider to abandon demand information rather than incur service costs. Originality/value This study extends the literature by examining service configuration or demand information in isolation with the goal of investigating their interaction, thereby revealing optimal combinations in a hybrid tourism platform supply chain under culture–tourism integration and ultimately expanding the findings of previous research on this topic. It also provides practical guidance for service configuration and demand information sharing in a hybrid tourism platform supply chain.