Permission re-delegation: attacks and defenses

Modern browsers and smartphone operating systems treat applications as mutually untrusting, potentially malicious principals. Applications are (1) isolated except for explicit IPC or inter-application communication channels and (2) unprivileged by default, requiring user permission for additional privileges. Although inter-application communication supports useful collaboration, it also introduces the risk of permission redelegation. Permission re-delegation occurs when an application with permissions performs a privileged task for an application without permissions. This undermines the requirement that the user approve each application’s access to privileged devices and data. We discuss permission re-delegation and demonstrate its risk by launching real-world attacks on Android system applications; several of the vulnerabilities have been confirmed as bugs. We discuss possible ways to address permission redelegation and present IPC Inspection, a new OS mechanism for defending against permission re-delegation. IPC Inspection prevents opportunities for permission redelegation by reducing an application’s permissions after it receives communication from a less privileged application. We have implemented IPC Inspection for a browser and Android, and we show that it prevents the attacks we found in the Android system applications. 1