Quality Information Disclosure and Blockchain Technology Adoption of Competitive Suppliers on the Third-Party E-Commerce Platform

This study investigates the quality information disclosure and blockchain technology adoption strategies of suppliers on a third-party e-commerce platform. Based on a Stackelberg game model, the impacts of blockchain technology adoption on the quality information disclosure decision and profit of the third-party e-commerce platform and suppliers are explored. The results indicate that whether blockchain adoption benefits suppliers depends on the unit blockchain cost and the reliability of quality information. Counterintuitively, higher information reliability may disadvantage suppliers under certain conditions. With the increase in unit blockchain cost, the incentive of suppliers to adopt blockchain is weakened, and suppliers need to adjust their strategies of quality information disclosure according to the adoption situation and the cost of blockchain. Adopting blockchain technology may be unfavorable to the suppliers but beneficial to the third-party e-commerce platform; the platform can incentivize suppliers to adopt blockchain and achieve a win-win situation. These findings provide some valuable managerial implications for the quality information disclosure decision of suppliers and blockchain adoption in the e-commerce platform supply chain.