感觉
可用的
心理学
情感科学
认知心理学
可信赖性
经验证据
认知科学
情感工作
社会心理学
认识论
计算机科学
哲学
万维网
作者
Lisa Feldman Barrett,Shir Atzil,Eliza Bliss‐Moreau,Lorena Chanes,Maria Gendron,Katie Hoemann,Yuta Katsumi,Ian R. Kleckner,Kristen A. Lindquist,Karen S. Quigley,Ajay B. Satpute,Eli Sennesh,Clare Shaffer,Jordan E. Theriault,Michele M. Tugade,Christiana Westlin
标识
DOI:10.1177/17456916251319045
摘要
A recently published article by van Heijst et al. attempted to reconcile two research approaches in the science of emotion—basic emotion theory and the theory of constructed emotion—by suggesting that the former explains emotions as bioregulatory states of the body whereas the latter explains feelings that arise from those state changes. This bifurcation of emotion into objective physical states and subjective feelings involves three misleading simplifications that fundamentally misrepresent the theory of constructed emotion and prevent progress in the science of emotion. In this article we identify these misleading simplifications and the resulting factual errors, empirical oversights, and evolutionary oversimplifications. We then discuss why such errors will continue to arise until scientists realize that the two theories are intrinsically irreconcilable. They rest on incommensurate assumptions and require different methods of evaluation. Only by directly considering these differences will these research silos in the science of emotion finally dissolve, speeding the accumulation of trustworthy scientific knowledge about emotion that is usable in the real world.
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