补贴
电池(电)
供应链
闭环
功率(物理)
计算机科学
业务
经济
工程类
物理
控制工程
热力学
营销
市场经济
作者
Abudureheman Kadeer,Wang Xiao-bin,Huanying He,Lei Dai
出处
期刊:PLOS ONE
[Public Library of Science]
日期:2025-06-13
卷期号:20 (6): e0322888-e0322888
标识
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0322888
摘要
Considering government subsidies for new energy electric vehicle manufacturers, the study will construct a static game model to analyze the optimal strategies of decision-makers from the perspectives of manufacturers and retailers. It will analysis the impact of key model parameters such as government subsidy criteria, the fund returns rate and market size on optimal strategy selection. Additionally, a dynamic game model will be developed to investigate the complex behavior characteristics of decision-makers, as well as the influence of different behaviors on their complex benefits. The research results show: First, government subsidy criteria, the fund return rate and market size importantly influence the optimal pricing strategies and recycling services. Second, the stability region of the equilibrium strategy is given. Moreover, when the decision-makers ‘s price adjustment speed exceeds a certain threshold, the equilibrium strategy undergoes complex behaviors such as bifurcation and chaos. The time-delay feedback control method is adopted to regulate the chaos. Ultimately, based on the findings, a series of targeted management insights and recommendations are proposed, indicating that while short-term government subsidies can lead to increased profits for members, excessive subsidies in the long run can result in system chaos and profit decline.
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