经济
反事实思维
福利
激励
微观经济学
边际效用
利用
公共经济学
计量经济学
计算机科学
认识论
计算机安全
哲学
市场经济
作者
Koichiro Ito,Takanori Ida,Makoto Tanaka
摘要
We study a problem in which policymakers need to screen self-selected individuals by unobserved heterogeneity in social welfare gains from a policy intervention. In our framework, the marginal treatment effects and marginal treatment responses arise as key statistics to characterize social welfare. We apply this framework to a randomized field experiment on electricity plan choice. Consumers were offered welfare-improving dynamic pricing with randomly assigned take-up incentives. We find that price-elastic consumers—who generate larger welfare gains—are more likely to self-select. Our counterfactual simulations quantify the optimal take-up incentives that exploit observed and unobserved heterogeneity in selection and welfare gains. (JEL C93, D12, L11, L94, L98)
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