Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Historical Individuals

ABSTRACT In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche sets out to answer the question of the value of morality by looking at the conditions under which it developed. However, there is a puzzle about why historical investigation should be required for assessing our moral practices, especially if the defining features of those practices have changed over time. The puzzle is that if morality is “historical,” then the features that will be revealed by historical investigation are ones that—ex hypothesi—are unlikely to characterize it now. And if these features do not characterize morality now, then why should a critique of morality need to take them into account? I argue that the solution to the puzzle is that history reveals that morality is a particular kind of entity, which I call a “historical individual.” I then provide an account of why it should matter for our evaluation of morality that it is an entity of this kind.