收入等值
拍卖理论
共同价值拍卖
维克里拍卖
广义二次价格拍卖
英国拍卖
收入
计算机科学
荷兰式拍卖
反向拍卖
数学优化
泊松过程
过程(计算)
远期拍卖
微观经济学
数理经济学
运筹学
泊松分布
经济
数学
统计
会计
操作系统
作者
Sheng‐Li Chen,Yunfeng Luo,Huiqiu Wu,Xiaohua Yang
标识
DOI:10.1109/wcica.2008.4594516
摘要
Optimal design of auction is one of hot research topics in the auction theory. Regarding starting the price as decision variable, here we study the optimal design of online auctions, by considering some features of online auctions, the stochastic entry of bidders (subject to Poisson process), the insertion fee proportional to the starting price, commission rates, buy-in penalties and time discount. We have analyzed the properties of extremum points of the starting price for maximizing seller's expected revenue, and found that, under certain conditions, the optimal starting price should be at the lowest allowable level, which is contrary to results from the classic auction theory and finds its optimality in reality. In addition, we have discussed the condition in which the seller, auction site and a total of two achieve simultaneously their own maximum, and the relations between starting price and some parameters. At last, some directions for further research are also put forward.
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