激励
分类
工资
委托代理问题
生产力
绩效工资
绩效工资
补偿(心理学)
微观经济学
代理(哲学)
经济
高管薪酬
计件工作
绩效工资
劳动经济学
业务
心理学
社会心理学
计算机科学
财务
宏观经济学
程序设计语言
哲学
认识论
公司治理
市场经济
作者
Charles Bram Cadsby,Fei Song,Francis Tapon
标识
DOI:10.5465/amj.2007.24634448
摘要
Agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Using a real—effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we compared pay—for—performance and fixed—salary compensation. The former achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected pay for performance, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under it. However, more risk—averse individuals were less likely to select pay for performance and less responsive to its incentives.
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