Mood, reasoning, and central executive processes.

How positive induced mood states affect reasoning was investigated in three experiments. In Experiment 1, consistent with resource allocation theory (H. C. Ellis & P. W. Ashbrook, 1987), both positive and negative mood suppressed performance on a deontic version of Wason's selection task (P. W. Cheng & K. J. Holyoak, 1985)—participants confirmed where they normally falsify. Experiment 2 revealed the same confirmatory responses for participants performing a concurrent distracter task, indicating that induced mood states suppress reasoning by depleting central executive resources. This hypothesis was directly tested in Experiment 3. Participants in a positive, but not in a negative, mood state showed suppressed performance on the Tower of London task (T. Shallice, 1982)—the classical central executive task. The robust positive mood effects and the confirmation effects are discussed in terms of the D. A. Norman and T. Shallice (1986) model of central executive function and recent accounts of selection task performance (L. Cosmides, 1989; K. I. Manktelow & D. E. Over, 1991; M. Oaksford & N. Chater, 1994).