紧急援助
道德风险
套利
提交
经济
库存(枪支)
大到不能倒
激励
货币经济学
事前
敞篷车
政府(语言学)
资本要求
首都(建筑)
存款保险
财务
业务
微观经济学
金融危机
宏观经济学
机械工程
历史
语言学
哲学
考古
数据库
计算机科学
工程类
结构工程
作者
Xiaoyu Tan,Zili Zhang,Xuejun Zhao,Cheng-Xiang Wang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.iref.2021.04.009
摘要
This paper analyzes the optimal regulation for “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) in a simple model. As the government cannot credibly commit to no bail-out during crises, banks have an incentive to become excessively large ex-ante. In this case, no single policy can fully eliminate the inefficiencies from TBTF. The optimal regulation for the first-best allocation features a capital requirement and an issuance of Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCos) where the former addresses the moral hazard issue from government bailouts and the latter improves risk-sharing. Moreover, a combination of the capital requirement and size regulation can implement a second-best allocation where the government has to bail out the banking sector but the social cost of bail-out is internalized by the banks. In this case, the capital requirement forces banks to internalize the bailout cost while the size regulation directly discourages banks to become large.
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