利用
经济
惩罚(心理学)
微观经济学
衡平法
议价能力
简单(哲学)
竞赛(生物学)
搭便车
不公平厌恶
不平等
社会心理学
法学
心理学
生物
认识论
数学分析
哲学
计算机科学
计算机安全
数学
激励
生态学
政治学
作者
Ernst Fehr,Klaus M. Schmidt
标识
DOI:10.1162/003355399556151
摘要
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.
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