业务
公司治理
代理(哲学)
撞车
代理成本
股票价格
库存(枪支)
委托代理问题
财务
控制(管理)
投资(军事)
功能(生物学)
情感(语言学)
股市崩盘
精算学
校长(计算机安全)
文件夹
股票市场
投资决策
家族企业
投资银行业务
佣金
作者
Yiyang Bian,Jaeyoung Cho,Bingren Sun
标识
DOI:10.1177/08944865261487467
摘要
Drawing on principal–principal agency theory, we examine how multiple family offices (MFOs) affect stock crash risk of family firms owned and managed by at least two founding families or family lineages. In a study of publicly listed Korean firms where principal–principal agency conflicts are prevalent due to substantial control by family owner-managers, we find that MFOs help reduce stock crash risk by enhancing governance mechanisms that facilitate the alignment of divergent principal interests, especially in non-business-group-affiliated family firms and those facing unfavorable investment environments. Overall, we contribute toward the understanding of the governance function of family offices.
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