审计委员会
不当影响
会计
审计
审计师独立性
首席审计官
独立性(概率论)
业务
审计证据
认证
联合审计
外部审计师
股东
审计报告
内部审计
公共关系
政治学
公司治理
法学
财务
统计
数学
作者
Nathan R. Berglund,Michelle Draeger,Mikhail Sterin
出处
期刊:Auditing-a Journal of Practice & Theory
[American Accounting Association]
日期:2021-06-10
卷期号:41 (1): 49-74
被引量:10
标识
DOI:10.2308/ajpt-2020-054
摘要
SUMMARY Audit committee members must be independent of management to protect shareholder interests. While current regulations restrict audit committee members from holding management positions (i.e., affiliations), studies find that management's preferences continue to impact audit committee decisions. This motivates analysis of independence threats beyond affiliations. We apply the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' conceptual approach to independence and examine the threat of management's undue influence over audit committee members. Examining the relative tenure of executives and audit committee members, we find that greater management influence is associated with a lower propensity of the auditor to issue a modified going concern opinion to a distressed client. We also find that greater management influence is associated with increased opinion shopping behavior. These findings are consistent with an undue influence threat to audit committee independence. Our results extend the academic literature and inform regulatory concerns on audit committee independence. Data Availability: The data used in this paper are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M42.
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