双头垄断
盈利能力指数
企业社会责任
投资(军事)
业务
竞赛(生物学)
外部性
产业组织
危害
投资策略
微观经济学
服务(商务)
经济
投资决策
社会责任
投资回报率
开放式投资公司
竞争优势
定价策略
服务提供商
营销
商业模式
进入壁垒
作者
Siliang Liu,Haiyan Wang
摘要
ABSTRACT On‐demand service platforms generally achieve growth by investing in performance or value‐added services. With increasing public concern about platforms' limited corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement, CSR investment may create new competitive advantages for platforms. However, the effectiveness of CSR investment on platform profitability in competitive markets remains unclear. Therefore, this study develops a duopoly competition model with two horizontally differentiated platforms to explore three scenarios: neither platform invests, both platforms invest, and only one platform invests. The model captures platforms' trade‐off in CSR investment, which not only directly benefits consumers but also indirectly harms them by raising the provider entry barrier and thereby reducing the benefit from cross‐network externality. We find that when consumers' cross‐network externality is high, the investing platform may charge a lower price than its noninvesting rival, as the investment weakens the platform's attractiveness. Under symmetric scenarios, CSR enhances platform profits when platform losses are not sufficiently low. Under asymmetric scenarios, CSR enhances platform profits when investment efficiency is not sufficiently lower than consumers' cross‐network externality. Furthermore, numerical simulations show that CSR investment is a dominant strategy for platforms in most cases. Interestingly, we find that CSR investment may harm consumer surplus, which depends on the interplay between consumers' cross‐network externality and investment efficiency.
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