誓言
股东
衡平法
情感(语言学)
投资(军事)
业务
经济
货币经济学
财务
公司治理
法学
政治学
语言学
政治
哲学
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2023.104272
摘要
Using the data of China A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as samples, this paper finds that major shareholders' equity pledge reduces the investment efficiency of the company, and the proportion of major shareholders' equity pledge to the total share capital is significantly negatively correlated with the investment efficiency of the company. In addition, when the company's external financing demand is small and the degree of marketization is low, the damage of major shareholders' equity pledge to investment efficiency is more and more obvious. The above evidence shows that the pledge of major shareholders' equity is a "self-interested tool" rather than a "value creation".
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