Information disclosure in a hybrid platform supply chain considering two-dimensional information uncertainty

Abstract Accepted by: M. Zied Babai As platforms have evolved over the past decades, their selling formats have become increasingly diversified, evolving from a binary framework of either the wholesale or agency models to the hybrid model combining both. Based on this, we consider a supply chain where a supplier sells differentiated products through a platform offering the hybrid model (hybrid platform for simplicity). Considering consumers’ two-dimensional information uncertainty, we build Nash game models to study how supply chain members disclose product information. Then, we examine the impact of information disclosure and study the equilibrium strategy of the supply chain. Further, we extend our model to the platform-led and supplier-led Stackelberg game, respectively, to investigate the impact of information disclosure’s timing. Besides, we investigate how to achieve Pareto improvement. We find that information disclosure generates the direct, spillover and interactive effects to supply chain members, which are positive when the initial information amount is sufficiently large. The equilibrium depends on the joint impact of the two-dimensional information uncertainty, which determines the relationship among the direct, spillover and interactive effects. The decision-making priority of one supply chain member gains greater information disclosure opportunities for itself while lowering its profits sometimes. The presence of prisoner’s dilemma lies in insufficient or excessive information disclosure. With different commission rates, the one supply chain member’s information disclosure changes from excessive to insufficient while the other changes conversely. The above results have significant implications for supply chain members.