Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato

Abstract Plato was the first philosopher, to my awareness, to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g., you and I are two, but neither you nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that his account of plural-partaking can be employed to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relational Forms, which can explain their absence from Plato’s Theory of Forms. My contention is that a conception of plural-partaking in relative Forms—pairs of Opposites—can rest on the account Plato gives of plural-partaking in a Form. I hope that an account of related individuals through plural-predication will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on the subject.