The Evolution of Opportunistic Behavior of Participating Subjects during the Operation Period of PPP Projects

Most of the public-private partnership (PPP) projects have entered the operational period in China. Due to information asymmetry, opportunistic behavior exists in the operation period of PPP projects. The opportunistic behavior of the participating subjects is an obstacle to the success of PPP projects and one of the root causes of low project performance. To investigate the evolutionary law of this behavior, the payment matrix of the strategic interaction between the investors and the government is constructed based on evolutionary game theory. Using MATLAB to simulate the evolutionary state and through the analysis of the evolutionary behavior of the interaction process, the influence of individual strategy choice on group behavior is revealed. The results show that the path evolution system of opportunistic behavior during the operation period of PPP projects can converge in two states, “good” and “bad,” and the determining factor is the relative returns of investors under various strategies. Reasonable incentives and penalties and reduced regulatory costs can effectively discourage opportunistic behavior. By regulating the parameters, the path evolution of opportunistic behavior can be optimized, and the group behavior can be induced to a good state. The research results can provide a reference for reducing the opportunistic behavior of participating subjects and improving the success rate of the PPP projects.