Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification of\nindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfare\nmaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions in\nthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others \nactions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences in\nfact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannot\nconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actual\ndistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects \nactions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictator\ngames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individuals\nwith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behave\nmore selfishly.