互惠(文化人类学)
上游(联网)
互惠规范
声誉
社会心理学
心理学
计算机科学
政治学
社会资本
电信
法学
作者
Ryohei Umetani,H. Yamamoto,Akira Gotō,Isamu Okada,Eizo Akiyama
出处
期刊:PLOS ONE
[Public Library of Science]
日期:2023-07-05
卷期号:18 (7): e0288019-e0288019
被引量:1
标识
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0288019
摘要
Indirect reciprocity is widely recognized as a mechanism for explaining cooperation and can be divided into two sub-concepts: downstream and upstream reciprocity. Downstream reciprocity is supported by reputation; if someone sees you helping someone else, the person who sees this will think higher of you, and you will be more likely to be helped. Upstream reciprocity is helping someone because you are being helped by somebody else, which often happens in everyday life and experimental games. This paper focuses on the behavior of "take" and examines negative upstream reciprocity using an upstream reciprocity framework. The term "take" is defined as "to steal rather than give resources to others." "If something is taken from you, do you take from others?" is an important extension for indirect reciprocity research; subsequently, this paper discusses experiments conducted on whether negative upstream reciprocity is chained and what causes it. The results demonstrated differences between positive and negative upstream reciprocity. In analyzing the data of nearly 600 participants to determine the extent to which negative upstream reciprocity is observed and the causes of negative upstream reciprocity, the study found that If individual A takes resources from individual B, then B is more likely to take resources from a third-party, individual C. Notably, some causes of positive upstream reciprocity were found to have no effect or the opposite effect on negative upstream reciprocity. The results also demonstrate that the first person to take can cause a chain reaction. This paper demonstrates the importance of the first person not taking from someone else and suggests the need to consider various behavioral options for future research on cooperation.
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