Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response: Protecting Civilians Using US Joint Forces

This monograph explores the evolution of genocide and mass atrocities from the 20th Century until today, focusing specifically on the ability and desirability of the US to employ the US Joint Force to protect innocent civilians from the hands of brutal dictators. Public discourse in the US today generally favors doing something to protect civilians rather than doing nothing. Reliving the not-too-distant memories of Rwanda and Kosovo is painful for most US citizens who witnessed the nightly newscasts and read the front page of the local newspaper. These two genocides demonstrate how a policy of nonintervention and limited intervention can lead to a failed strategy with horrific effects on civilian populations. US Joint Forces can respond to a wide array of challenges and arguably does so better than any other force in the world. Should the US Joint Force deploy to protect civilians, even if a vital national interest is not at stake? This author contends that it should and this monograph explores and defends such an assertion, beginning with a definition of genocide, the evolution of genocide through the 20th century to today, and a review of the narrative for and against intervention. Included in this is a brief discussion of the morality of intervention and the effects on the US Joint Force, as part of the narrative. The author describes the future environment and establishes the strategic context by which the US Joint Force could potentially operate in, given the political will. This monograph reviews two distinct genocides, Rwanda and Kosovo, tragic events that were both unnecessary and the driving forces behind The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The concept of protecting civilians using coercive force is vague and there are serious gaps in US Joint doctrine that directly affects how the US Joint Force organizes and operates. After reviewing lessons learned from two recent genocides, the author reviews the strategic context affecting the US Joint Force and concludes with recommendations in force structure and doctrine that informs how to think about the concept of protecting civilians using US Joint Forces.