斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
温室气体
排放交易
产业组织
清洁发展机制
竞赛(生物学)
议价能力
业务
微观经济学
机制(生物学)
纳什均衡
博弈论
过程(计算)
经济
计算机科学
生态学
营销
哲学
操作系统
认识论
生物
作者
Hui Li,Rou Li,Meng Shang,Yu Liu,Dandan Su
标识
DOI:10.1093/ijlct/ctab085
摘要
Abstract Carbon emissions trading policy is a market mechanism which promotes global greenhouse gas emissions reduction and reduces global carbon dioxide emissions. The emissions reduction in the supply chain operation has become a hot issue in supply chain management. Thus, this paper studies the optimal cap setting and pricing in chain-to-chain system under carbon emissions trading mechanism. Based on the double decentralized scenario, the five different cooperation models are established by introducing the structural cooperation and the contractual cooperation (the wholesale price contract) of supply chains. The optimal solutions of these models are obtained through the Stackelberg game and Nash game. The results show that the bargaining power of the supply chains is changed by the asymmetric competition structure. Besides, the government should emphasize the influencing factors change of the cap in the process of setting carbon emissions cap.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI