Aristotle on Perception and Perception-like Appearance: De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9

Abstract It is now common to explain some of incidental perception’s features by means of a different capacity, called phantasia . Phantasia , usually translated as ‘imagination,’ is thought to explain how incidental perception can be false and representational by being a constitutive part of perception. Through a close reading of De Anima 3.3, 428b10–29a9, I argue against this and for perception first : phantasia is always a product of perception, from which it initially inherits all its characteristics. No feature of perception is explained directly by phantasia , and phantasia is never a part of perception. Phantasia is not imagination or representation, as many have thought, but perception-like appearance. Aristotle thus recognizes alongside three different types of perception three different types of perception-like appearance.