On the Interaction Between Aggregators, Electricity Markets and Residential Demand Response Providers

To decarbonize the heating sector, residential consumers may install heat pumps. Coupled with heating loads with high thermal inertia, these thermostatically controlled loads may provide a significant source of demand side flexibility. Since the capacity of residential consumers is typically insufficient to take part in the day-ahead electricity market (DAM), aggregators act as mediators that monetize the flexibility of these loads through demand response (DR). In this paper, we study the strategic interactions between an aggregator, its consumers and the DAM using a bilevel optimization framework. The aggregator-consumer interaction is captured either as a Stackelberg or a Nash Bargaining Game, leveraging chance-constrained programming to model limited controllability of residential DR loads. The aggregator takes strategic positions in the DAM, considering the uncertainty on the market outcome, represented as a stochastic Stackelberg Game. Results show that the DR provider-aggregator cooperation may yield significant monetary benefits. The aggregator cost-effectively manages the uncertainty on the DAM outcome and the limited controllability of its consumers. The presented methodology may be used to assess the value of DR in a deregulated power system or may be directly integrated in the daily routine of DR aggregators.