采购
代理(哲学)
信息不对称
业务
激励
私人信息检索
供应链
供应链管理
产业组织
危害
委托代理问题
机构设计
经济
微观经济学
营销
计算机科学
财务
哲学
公司治理
计算机安全
认识论
政治学
法学
作者
Long Gao,Mohammad E. Nikoofal,Wei Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2021.0285
摘要
Problem definition: We study a procurement problem, where the supplier holds superior cost information and can learn to improve efficiency over time. Despite its prevalence, the supply chain literature provides limited guidance on how to manage learning suppliers with evolving private information. Methodology/results: We use mechanism design. We show that supplier learning has both efficiency and agency effects, it can induce countervailing incentives, and the agency effect can overwhelm the efficiency effect. As a result, (i) supplier learning can hurt profits, (ii) information asymmetry can improve efficiency, (iii) production distortion can go upward, and (iv) ignoring the agency effect of learning can mislead contract design and inflict severe losses. Managerial implications: Our results suggest that previous studies may have overlooked the downside of learning and overestimated the harm of information asymmetry. Moreover, our results help explain when and why firms should overproduce output and disclose private information voluntarily. By highlighting the strategic role of supplier learning, this study sharpens our understanding of supply chain management. Funding: L. Gao is partly supported by the CoR research grant at University of California, Riverside. W. Zhang is partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71821002]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0285 .
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI