古诺竞争
伯特兰竞争
产品差异化
双头垄断
经济
微观经济学
产品市场
竞赛(生物学)
社会福利
福利
产品(数学)
贝特朗悖论(经济学)
寡头垄断
市场经济
激励
生物
数学
生态学
政治学
法学
几何学
作者
Fangyan Wang,Félix Muñoz-García
出处
期刊:Research Square - Research Square
日期:2023-05-29
标识
DOI:10.21203/rs.3.rs-2982371/v1
摘要
Abstract We examine how endogenous product differentiation affects the behavior of a mixed duopoly market where a private firm competes with a partially privatized public firm under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. We also analytically derive the optimal degree of partial privatization of the public firm. Generally, privatizations increase the likelihood of no firm investing in equilibrium, resulting in markets with more homogenous goods. The public firm is more motivated to invest in product differentiation, particularly when prioritizing social welfare, while the private firm undertakes more investments when investments are not highly effective under Bertrand competition. We also demonstrate that a complete nationalization is not necessarily optimal in all contexts, and whether regulators privatize more or less depends on different market settings. Partial privatizations can enhance welfare when firms compete in quantities and investments in product differentiation are moderately effective. However, complete nationalization is socially optimal when firms compete in prices. JEL classification: D43, L13, L32, L33
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