业务
杠杆(统计)
产业组织
利润(经济学)
微观经济学
边际成本
商业
经济
计算机科学
机器学习
作者
Qingning Cao,Xianjun Geng,Jun Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jretai.2014.10.005
摘要
We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the manufacturer in form of a lower wholesale price. This finding contributes a novel rationale for retailer bundling to the bundling literature. Whenever the bundling option causes this concession-extraction effect, the retailer always benefits from the lower wholesale price. The manufacturer, nevertheless, does not necessarily suffer because bundling can lead to a higher consumer demand. We also show that the manufacturer's marginal production cost plays a critical role in driving the retailer's bundling decision, concession extraction behavior and consequently the total channel profit.
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