Collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain under recovery price and service competition

With the increasing growth of consumers' request for recovery channels, in addition to collecting price, the collecting service has gradually become a competitive point for collectors to collect used products. Focusing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with recovery competition (on collecting price and collecting service) and distinguishing collecting quality, we propose two models (decentralized and centralized models) to study the collection strategies and profits of the CLSC. Moreover, we analyze the impact of the collecting competition and quality on the CLSC. Finally, a revenue-cost sharing contract (RCSC) is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. And a numerical example is illustrated to verify the contract's efficiency. It is found that the collected quantities and profits of the CLSC members are positively correlated with the remanufacturable ratio. The collecting competition dampens consumers' enthusiasm for recycling, which is not conducive to collectors to carry out collecting activity, resulting in the reduction of the CLSC's profit. The collectors appropriately improving collecting prices and service levels can increase the collected quantities, but to cope with the increasing competition, increasing collecting price is the main means for collectors to attract consumers to recycle. In addition, the designed RCSC can effectively improve the CLSC's efficiency and increase the profits of each party.