习惯
出勤
心理学
投影(关系代数)
补贴
事前
经济
计量经济学
社会心理学
数学
经济增长
算法
市场经济
宏观经济学
作者
Dan Acland,Matthew Levy
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2015-01-01
卷期号:61 (1): 146-160
被引量:6
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2091
摘要
We implement a gym-attendance incentive intervention and elicit subjects' predictions of their postintervention attendance. We find that subjects greatly overpredict future attendance, which we interpret as evidence of partial naiveté with respect to present bias. We find a significant postintervention attendance increase, which we interpret as habit formation, and which subjects appear not to predict ex ante. These results are consistent with a model of projection bias with respect to habit formation. Neither the intervention incentives, nor the small posttreatment incentives involved in our elicitation mechanism, appear to crowd out existing intrinsic motivation. The combination of naiveté and projection bias in gym attendance can help to explain limited take-up of commitment devices by dynamically inconsistent agents, and points to new forms of contracts. Alternative explanations of our results are discussed. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2091 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
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