From Hu’s Outward-Looking Pragmatism to Xi’s Ambitious Nationalist Leninism: Contrasting Agendas in Politburo Collective Study Sessions

ABSTRACTThis article examines the changes in policy orientations in China since the 2000s. It explores whether these changes are influenced by China's shifting relative power or by leadership transitions. The analysis focuses on the agenda of the Politburo Collective Study Session (PCSS) during the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. This article reveals a shift from outward-looking pragmatism in Hu's era to ambitious nationalistic Leninism in Xi's era. These distinct policy orientations persisted throughout their 10-year rule, despite changing international environments and China's economic growth. This underscores the significance of leadership in shaping policy orientations in China.KEYWORDS: Politburo Collective StudyLeadershipXi JinpingHu JintaoPolicy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For data on GDP, refer to Yen Nee Lee, 'These Charts Shows the Dramatic Increase in China's Debt', CNBC, June 28, 2021, accessed November 30, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/29/china-economy-charts-show-how-much-debt-has-grown.html.2 Nien-chung Chang Liao, 'Winds of Change: Assessing China's Assertive Turn in Foreign Policy', Journal of Asian and African Studies 53(6), (2018), pp. 880–895; Susan L. Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).3 Valerie Bunce, 'Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation in the Soviet Republic', Comparative Politics 11(4), (1979), pp.379–401.4 Lyman Miller, 'More Already on Politburo Procedures Under Hu Jintao', China Leadership Monitor 17 (2006), pp. 1–26. In the 20th Party Congress, the number of the Politburo was reduced to 24.5 Of the 34 meetings held between November 2002 and June 2004, 28 involved the PCSS. Lyman Miller, 'More Already on Politburo Procedures Under Hu Jintao'.6 The articles published by Xinhua News Agency (新华社) provide information on the dates, topics, lecturers, and major remarks of the general party secretary after each PCSS. These articles are compiled on the website of the Communist Party Members (共产党网).7 Nien-chung Chang Liao; Susan L. Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise.8 Alastair Iain Johnston, 'How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?' International Security 37 (4), (2013), pp. 7–48; Bjorn Jerden, 'The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It', The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7(1), (2014), pp. 47–88.9 Alastair Iain Johnston, 'How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?'.10 Susan L. Shirk, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise.11 Suisheng Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2023).12 Lucian W. Pye, 'On Chinese Pragmatism in the 1980s', The China Quarterly 106 (1986), pp. 207–234.13 Kevin Rudd, 'The World According to Xi Jinping: What China's Ideologue in Chief Really Believes', Foreign Affairs 101(6), (2022), accessed June 8, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/world-according-xi-jinping-china-ideologue-kevin-rudd.14 Joseph Torigian, 'Xi Jinping and Ideology' in Lucas Myers (ed), Essays on China and U.S. Policy (Washington D.C.: Wilson Center 2022), accessed June 8, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/2021–22-wilson-china-fellowship-essays-china-and-us-policy.15 Cao Yingwang 曹应旺, '十六届中共中央政治局集体学习综论' [Discussing the Central Politburo Collective Study at the 16th Party Congress], 中国延安干部学院学报 [Journal of Yanan Cadre School in China] 4(6), (2011), pp. 47–53.16 The frequency of PCSS sessions varied during Hu Jintao's terms, with ten and six sessions held in the fourth and fifth years of his first term, respectively, while only six and two sessions were held in the fourth and fifth years of his second term, respectively.17 '中央政治局集体学习宪法 胡锦涛谈加强领导干部学习' [The Central Politburo Collectively Studied the Constitution. Hu Jintao Urged Leading Cadres to Study], October 26, 2012, 新华网 [Xinhua Network], accessed December 12, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2012/10/26/ARTI1351232330310600.shtml.18 Yiyi Lu, 'The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo: A Multipurpose Tool of China's Central Leadership', The University of Nottingham China Policy Institute Briefing Series 27, (2007).19 Li Yanan 李亚男 and Wang Jiugao 王久高, '中央政治局集体学习制度研究'[A Study on the Institution of the Central Politburo Collective Study], 思想教育研究 [Research on Thought Education] 12(306), (2019), pp. 120–124; Wen-Hsuan Tsai and Nicola Dean, 'The CCP's Learning System: Thought Unification and Regime Adaptation', The China Journal 69, (2013), pp. 87–107.20 Yiyi Lu, 'The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo'.21 Lyman Miller, 'Party Politburo Processes under Hu Jintao', China Leadership Monitor 11, (2004).22 In the 'first face of power', actors engage in competition to influence the alternatives for agenda items that have already been established. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', The American Political Science Review 56(4), (1962), pp.947–952.23 Yiyi Lu, 'The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo'.24 Zhao Ping 赵平, '对中共中央政治局集体学习制度的评议' [Appraising the Institution of the Central Politburo Collective Study in the Chinese Communist Party], 中共乐山市委党校学报 [Journal of Leshan City Chinese Communist Party] 14(2), (2012), pp. 51–54.25 Alice Miller, 'Politburo Processes under Xi Jinping', China Leadership Monitor 47, (2015).26 In Xi Jinping's era, out of a total of 84 PCSS sessions, nine were self-study sessions, which focused on topics such as the spirit of the 18th Party Congress, building a modern economy system, the roles of markets and the state in resource allocation, and advancing socialism with Chinese characteristics through studying Party history.27 In Xi's first term, out of a total of 43 sessions, 22 featured lectures by scholars, 15 involved presentations by Party and government officials, five were self-study sessions, and one was a visit to zhongguancun. In Xi's second term, out of a total 41 sessions, 25 were lectures by researchers, 10 were presentations by Party and government officials, four were self-study sessions, and two involved visits different venues.28 Wen-Hsuan Tsai and Nicola Dean.29 Teng Mingzheng 滕明政, '十六大以来的中央政治局集体学习研究'[A Study on the Central Politburo Collective Study Since the 16th Party Congress], 天津行政学院学报 [Journal of Tianjin Administration School] 15 (4), 2013; Wen-Hsuan Tsai and Nicola Dean; Alice Miller, 'Politburo Processes under Xi Jinping'.30 Historical topics, often tied to the CCP's legitimacy, are classified under politics in this article.31 The term 'Three Stricts and Three Steadies' refers to the principle of being strict in cultivating one's moral character, preventing the abuse of power, and disciplining oneself, as well as being steady in planning matters, starting undertakings, and conducting oneself.32 '习近平: 要使暴力恐怖分子成为'过街老鼠 人人喊打' [Xi Jinping: Letting Violent Terrorists Become the Target of Universal Detestation, Eliciting Outcries from All], 新华网 [Xinhua Network] April 26, 2014, accessed December 12, 2022, https://news.12371.cn/2014/04/26/ARTI1398509333310363.shtml.33 '习近平主持中共中央政治局第二十三次集体学习' [Xi Jinping Hosted 23rd Central Politburo Collective Study of the Chinese Communist Party], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], May 30, 2015, accessed December 12, 2022, https://syss.12371.cn/2015/05/30/ARTI1432976807305439.shtml.34 '习近平在中央政治局第二十六次集体学习时强调坚持系统思维构建大安全格局为建设社会主义现代化国家提供坚强保障' [Xi Jinping Emphasized the Maintenance of Systematic Thought to Construct a Robust Security Structure, Providing Strong Guarantees for the Construction of a Socialist Modern Country], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], December 12, 2020, Accessed December 20, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2020/12/12/ARTI1607759816535313.shtml.35 '胡锦涛主持中共中央政治局第十五次集体学习' [Hu Jintao Hosted the 15th Central Politburo Collective Study of the Chinese Communist Party], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], July 24, 2004, Accessed December 12, 2022, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2004–07/24/content_9795.htm.36 '胡锦涛在政治局第十次集体学习时强调: 坚持以宽广的眼界观察世界分析形势' [Hu Jintao Emphasized in the 10th Politburo Collective Study: Broadening Perspectives for Observing the World], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], October 26, 2012, Accessed December 14, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2012/10/26/ARTI1351230307670240.shtml.37 Collective Session to the Appreciation the Importance of Promoting Quantum Technologies, Strengthening Strategies and Systematic Structures for Quantum Technology Development] , 新华网 [Xinhua Network], October 17, 2020, Accessed December 14, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2020/10/17/ARTI1602921796091459.shtml.38 '习近平在中央政治局第二十四次集体学习时强调 深刻认识推进量子科技发展重大意义 加强量子科技发展战略谋划和系统布局' [Xi Jinping Emphasized in the 24th Central Politburo Collective Session to the Appreciation the Importance of Promoting Quantum Technologies, Strengthening Strategies and Systematic Structures for Quantum Technology Development], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], October 17, 2020, Accessed December 14, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2020/10/17/ARTI1602921796091459.shtml.39 Barry Naughton, The Rise of China's 1978 to 2020 Industrial Policy (Mexico: Academic Network of Latin America and the Caribbean on China, 2021).40 '十七届中央政治局第四次集体学习 胡锦涛主持: 强调充分运用科学技术力量 打赢防治非典型肺炎的攻坚战' [Hu Jintao Hosted the Fourth Central Politburo Collective Study in the 17th Party Congress: Emphasizing the Use of Scientific Technology to Defeat SARS], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], April 29, 2003, Accessed December 14, 2022, https://news.12371.cn/2014/09/24/ARTI1411547526702650.shtml.41 Ewan Smith, 'The Rule of Law Doctrine of the Politburo', The China Journal 79, (2018), pp. 40–61.42 '政治局第十四次集体学习 胡锦涛强调: 大力加强党的执政理论建设' [Hu Jintao Emphasized in the 14th Politburo Collective Study: Strengthening the Construction of Party's Ruling Theories], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], October 26, 2012, Accessed December 14, 2022, https://www.12371.cn/2012/10/26/ARTI1351229639733159.shtml.43 '习近平主持中共中央政治局第七次集体学习' [Xi Jinping Hosted the 7th Central Politburo Collective Study of the Chinese Communist Party], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], June 26, 2013, accessed December 17, 2022, https://news.12371.cn/2013/06/26/ARTI1372232018282789.shtml.44 '习近平: 牢记历史经验历史教训历史警示 为国家治理能力现代化提供有益借鉴' [Xi Jinping: Keeping in Mind Historical Experience, Lessons, and Admonitions and Drawing Lessons for Modernization of State Governance], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], October 13, 2014, accessed December 17, 2022, https://news.12371.cn/2014/10/13/ARTI1413196364304826.shtml.45 Suisheng Zhao, 'From Affirmative to Assertive Patriots: Nationalism in Xi Jinping's China', The Washington Quarterly 44(4), (2021), pp. 141–161.46 Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, 'Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Island', International Security 23(3), (1989–99), pp. 114–146.47 Yingjie Guo, 'From Marxism to Nationalism: The Chinese Communist Party's Discursive Shift in the Post-Mao Era', Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52 (2019), pp. 355–365.48 '习近平在中共中央政治局第二十次集体学习时强调 坚持运用辩证唯物主义世界观方法论 提高解决我国改革发展基本问题本领' [In the 20th Central Politburo Collective Session, Xi Jinping Emphasized to Employ a Dialectical Materialism Worldview to Address to Fundamental Challenged in China's Reform and Development], 新华网 [Xinhua Network], January 24, 2015, accessed December 14, 2022, https://news.12371.cn/2015/01/24/ARTI1422089386231547.shtml.49 David Shambaugh, China's Leaders from Mao to Now (Cambridge: Polity, 2021); Suisheng Zhao, The Dragon Roars Back.50 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, 'The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations', Foreign Affairs 97(2), (2018), pp. 60–70.51 Alastair Iain Johnston, 'The Failures of the "Failure of Engagement" with China', The Washington Quarterly 42(2), (2019), pp. 99–114.52 Tan made a similar argument that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiaobao aimed for economic liberalization but were unsuccessful due to resistance from bureaucrats. See Yeling Tan, 'How the WTO Changed China', Foreign Affairs 100(2), (2021), pp. 90–102.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Research Fund.