逆向选择
补贴
贷款
道德风险
风险投资
外部性
业务
利率
福利
政府(语言学)
财务
经济
首都(建筑)
货币经济学
微观经济学
激励
市场经济
语言学
历史
哲学
考古
作者
Saul Lach,Zvika Neeman,Mark Schankerman
出处
期刊:American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
[American Economic Association]
日期:2021-08-01
卷期号:13 (3): 238-272
被引量:2
摘要
We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing and a second with a lower interest plus cofinancing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, the cost of public funds, and the effectiveness of the private venture capital industry. (JEL D82, D86, G24, L26, O31, G32, H81)
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