专制
语言变化
价值(数学)
股东
业务
样品(材料)
货币经济学
付款
事前
经济
民主
公司治理
财务
计算机科学
机器学习
宏观经济学
色谱法
艺术
政治学
法学
政治
文学类
化学
作者
Yan‐Leung Cheung,P. Raghavendra Rau,Aris Stouraitis
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2020-12-08
卷期号:67 (10): 6235-6265
被引量:37
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3763
摘要
We analyze a hand-collected sample of bribery cases from around the world to describe how the payment of bribes affects shareholder value. The net present value of a bribe conditional on getting caught is close to zero for the median firm in our sample. However, controlling for industry, country, and firm characteristics, a $1 increase in the size of the bribe is associated with an ex ante $6–$9 increase in the value of the firm, suggesting a correlation between the size of bribes and the size of available benefits. Proxies for information disclosure appear significant in explaining these benefits with more disclosure associated with lower benefits. However, this result is driven by democratic countries where bribe-paying firms receive smaller benefits relative to the bribes they pay. Information disclosure is not significant in autocratic countries. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
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