语言变化
官僚主义
激励
政府(语言学)
寻租
论证(复杂分析)
吓阻理论
执行
中国
公共经济学
人力资本
逆向选择
利用
政治
政治学
经济
业务
经济增长
市场经济
财务
计算机科学
生物化学
哲学
文学类
化学
艺术
法学
语言学
计算机安全
作者
Junyan Jiang,Zijie Shao,Zhiyuan Zhang
标识
DOI:10.1017/s0007123420000393
摘要
Abstract Fighting corruption is often seen as a crucial step toward building better institutions, but how it affects political selection remains less well understood. This article argues that in systems where corruption functions as an informal incentive for government to attract talent, anticorruption initiatives that curb rent-seeking opportunities may unintentionally weaken both the quality and the representativeness of the bureaucracy. The authors test this argument in China using an original nationwide survey of government officials and an identification strategy that exploits exogenous variations in enforcement levels created by the recent anticorruption campaign. The study finds that intensified enforcement has generated two potentially negative selection effects: a deterrence effect that lowers the average ability of newly recruited bureaucrats, and a compositional effect that discourages the entry of lower-class individuals in favor of those who are affluent and well connected. These findings highlight important hidden human capital costs of corruption elimination in developing countries.
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