语言变化
股东
政治
外商直接投资
价值(数学)
经济
投资(军事)
货币经济学
连接(主束)
业务
国际经济学
股东价值
会计
市场经济
金融体系
公司治理
宏观经济学
财务
政治学
法学
机器学习
文学类
工程类
艺术
结构工程
计算机科学
标识
DOI:10.1257/000282806776157704
摘要
Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.
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