权力下放
联邦制
经济
财政联邦制
政治
合作联邦制
碎片(计算)
联邦预算
膨胀(宇宙学)
政治学
宏观经济学
财务
市场经济
操作系统
物理
计算机科学
法学
理论物理学
会计年度
作者
Jonathan Rodden,Erik Wibbels
出处
期刊:World Politics
[Cambridge University Press]
日期:2002-07-01
卷期号:54 (4): 494-531
被引量:323
摘要
Recent research on federalism is extremely divided. While some tout the benefits of “market-preserving” federalism, others point to the fragmentation and incoherence of policy in federal states. This research bridges the divide by analyzing the political andfiscalstructures that are likely to account for the highly divergent economic experiences of federal systems around die world. To test these propositions, the authors use an original data set to conduct analyses of budget balance and inflation infifteenfederationsaround the world from 1978 through 1996. The empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal decentralization, the nature of intergovernmental finance, and vertical partisan relations all influence macroeconomic outcomes. The find- ings have broad implications for the widespread move toward greater decentralization and for the theoretical literatures on federalism and macroeconomics.
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