We prove that differential Nash equilibria are generic amongst local Nash\nequilibria in continuous zero-sum games. That is, there exists an open-dense\nsubset of zero-sum games for which local Nash equilibria are non-degenerate\ndifferential Nash equilibria. The result extends previous results to the\nzero-sum setting, where we obtain even stronger results; in particular, we show\nthat local Nash equilibria are generically hyperbolic critical points. We\nfurther show that differential Nash equilibria of zero-sum games are\nstructurally stable. The purpose for presenting these extensions is the recent\nrenewed interest in zero-sum games within machine learning and optimization.\nAdversarial learning and generative adversarial network approaches are touted\nto be more robust than the alternative. Zero-sum games are at the heart of such\napproaches. Many works proceed under the assumption of hyperbolicity of\ncritical points. Our results justify this assumption by showing `almost all'\nzero-sum games admit local Nash equilibria that are hyperbolic.\n