扫描链
计算机科学
旁道攻击
架空(工程)
物理不可克隆功能
嵌入式系统
密码学
硬件安全模块
重新使用
测试向量
可靠性(半导体)
利用
混淆
计算机安全
计算机硬件
工程类
集成电路
试验装置
人工智能
功率(物理)
物理
操作系统
废物管理
量子力学
作者
Wei Zhou,Aijiao Cui,Cassi Chen,Gang Qu
标识
DOI:10.1109/isqed57927.2023.10129349
摘要
Scan-based side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the security of cryptographic chips and locking mechanisms are one of the most effective methods against these attacks. However, securing the test key that locks the scan but must be shared among test engineers arises as a new challenge. In this paper, we solve this challenge by adopting the physical unclonable function (PUF) design to generate test keys that are unique for each chip. A one-time programming structure (OTPS) is used when the PUF response is first generated to improve its reliability. The security of the PUF response is achieved by obfuscation such that it can be retrieved only when a specific validation test vector presents. We implement the proposed secure scan design by reusing the original scan chain to reduce overhead. We demonstrate that the proposed secure scan design can protect the crypto chips against all existing scan-based side-channel attacks while incurring negligibly low overhead.
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