补贴
软件部署
激励
电动汽车
业务
投资(军事)
环境经济学
背景(考古学)
产业组织
公共经济学
微观经济学
计算机科学
经济
物理
市场经济
量子力学
功率(物理)
古生物学
政治
政治学
法学
生物
操作系统
作者
Rongkai Chen,Ruguo Fan,Dongxue Wang,Qianyi Yao
出处
期刊:Energy
[Elsevier]
日期:2022-10-14
卷期号:264: 125747-125747
被引量:70
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.energy.2022.125747
摘要
With the current booming electric vehicle industry, an insufficient supply of electric vehicle charging infrastructure (EVCI) has become a major barrier to further penetration of electric vehicles. Chinese provincial and municipal governments have introduced multiple incentives to address EVCI investment obstacles and promote EVCI deployment. However, the effectiveness and differential effects of these policies are unclear. In this context, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model in complex networks for EVCI deployment that captures the dynamic interactions as well as internal and external influences in infrastructure networks. Leveraging this model, this paper simulates the effects of multiple incentive policies, including investment subsidies, construction subsidies, operation subsidies, user charging subsidies, and policy mixes on EVCI deployment. The results reveal that investment subsidies are quite effective but have more pronounced marginal diminishing effects. Both construction and operation subsidies have had a steady and positive impact. Implementing the two incentives as a policy mix can exert complementary effects, but a careful cost-benefit analysis is needed to prevent incentive saturation. The effect of charging subsidies is not as significant as other incentives. Finally, incentive policies should be implemented for a long time and adjusted for different markets and stages to optimize effectiveness.
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