Intention to report wrongdoing: The role of the number of people aware of the wrongdoing, authority, and the presence of legal penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers

In recent years, whistleblowing has uncovered several cases of wrongdoing committed by organizations and individuals in Japan. However, a survey by Japan’s Consumer Affairs Agency (2016) showed that the prospect of retaliation inhibits people from whistleblowing. Although the Japanese government is considering establishing legal penalties for people who retaliate against whistleblowers research has yet to determine whether such penalties encourage whistleblowing in actuality. According to the social impact theory, diffusion of responsibility becomes more likely as more people recognize wrongdoing or when the wrongdoing is recognized by a strong authority figure. Previous studies have shown that when diffusion of responsibility occurs, individuals’ intention to report wrongdoing is suppressed. However, previous research has not examined whether the presence of a strong authority figure inhibits whistleblowing intention. Using a hypothetical situation method, the present study examined whether the intention to report wrongdoing is influenced by the number of people who recognize the wrongdoing, the authority of those who recognize the wrongdoing, and the existence of legal penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers. Three hypotheses were formulated: (1) participants are more likely to report wrongdoing when there are legal penalties for retaliating against whistleblowers compared to when no such penalties exist; (2) participants are less likely to report wrongdoing when a strong authority figure (e.g., the manager from a head office) recognizes the wrongdoing, as opposed to someone with weak authority (e.g., a manager without decision-making power); (3) the intention of reporting whistleblowing does not depend on the number of people aware of the wrongdoing. A total of 226 university students participated in the study. 2 (the presence of legal penalties for retaliation against whistleblowers) × 2 (number of people who recognize wrongdoing) × 2 (authority of a boss who recognizes wrongdoing) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The results showed that hypotheses 1 and 2 were supported, whereas hypothesis 3 was not. These findings suggest that whistleblowing will be encouraged when legal penalties exist against retaliation and when companies train managers to be aware of the influence of authority.