Data sharing between platform and seller: An analysis of contracts, privacy, and regulation

数据共享 背景(考古学) 下游(制造业) 计算机科学 业务 社会规划师 上游(联网) 产品(数学) 信息隐私 共享经济 互联网隐私 微观经济学 万维网 营销 电信 经济 医学 古生物学 替代医学 几何学 数学 病理 生物
作者
A. Arora,Tarun Jain
出处
期刊:European Journal of Operational Research [Elsevier BV]
卷期号:313 (3): 1105-1118 被引量:31
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2023.09.035
摘要

Online platforms share their customers’ data with their upstream sellers, which is utilized by the sellers to gain better insights about the customers. This may help sellers to develop a product that would provide higher value to the customers. However, such data sharing among the firms causes privacy concerns among customers. In this paper, we study a game-theoretic model with an online platform (or buyer), seller, and customers facing privacy concerns. We study scenarios where the platform, the seller, and the customers may decide the extent of data to be shared by the platform with the seller under different models, such as marketplace and reselling models. Later, we also analyze the regulation of data sharing by the social planner. Our analysis characterizes the equilibrium data sharing and quality decisions, leading to intriguing findings. Specifically, under the marketplace model, the regulation of data sharing can result in either an increase or a decrease in the extent of data shared by the platform. Furthermore, compared to the scenario where a platform decides the extent of data sharing, the regulation of data sharing proves advantageous for seller and customers while being less beneficial for the platform itself. Interestingly, in the context of reselling model, we find that the regulation of data sharing does not influence the extent of data shared or the players’ payoffs compared to unregulated scenarios. • We study impact of contracts on extent of data sharing. • We also study impact of customers’ privacy concerns. • We consider case where data sharing is regulated. • Regulation may increase or decrease players’ payoffs. • Impact of regulation depends on contractual mechanisms.
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