风险投资
业务
投资(军事)
互联网
责任
财务
利用
首都(建筑)
启动
首次公开发行
休克(循环)
投资银行业务
金融体系
工商管理
法学
政治
历史
医学
内科学
万维网
计算机科学
计算机安全
考古
政治学
作者
Ofer Eldar,Jillian Grennan
摘要
Abstract We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
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