Filtering rivalry: How domestic politics shapes U.S. Geo-economic instruments toward China

Why does the United States’ economic strategy toward China shift among tariffs, export controls and industrial subsidies despite consistent bipartisan recognition of rivalry? This article argues that while systemic competition creates the imperative for geo-economic confrontation, domestic political mechanisms determine which instruments are deployed. Electoral incentives, lobbying coalitions and institutional mediation filter structural pressures into distinct policy choices. The argument is evaluated through process tracing of four episodes: Trump’s Section 301 tariffs (2018–2019), Huawei export controls (2019–2021), CHIPS Act subsidies (2022–2023) and Trump’s reciprocal tariffs (2025). The analysis shows tariffs were electorally visible but economically costly and institutionally fragile; export controls were less visible but more durable due to bipartisan security framing and bureaucratic embedding; subsidies reflected lobbying institutionalized in legislation; and 2025 tariffs demonstrated recurrence and escalation through aggressive but legally precarious emergency authority. Theoretically, the study advances geo-economic scholarship by demonstrating how domestic mechanisms structure instrument visibility, durability and recurrence. Empirically, it shows how US measures contributed to an escalatory cycle reshaping US–China relations and the global economic order.