Blockchain Microgrid Supervision Mechanism Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory

With the development of small and medium-sized microgrids, more community power grid systems use blockchain technology to achieve distributed energy exchange and sharing. However, with the introduction of blockchain decentralization technology, there are bribery attacks on the information security between users, microgrid service providers, and regulatory departments, which affect the balance of microgrids. To solve the problem of information exchange security among users, microgrid service providers, and regulatory departments, A micro grid bribery attack evolutionary game model based on small-scale blockchain information exchange was proposed, and the evolutionary stability of the strategy choices of each participant was analysed. The impact of different scenarios on the three-party strategy choices was explored, and the stability of the equilibrium point in the three-party game system was further analysed. Finally, simulation analysis was conducted using MATLAB, and the results showed that in a small-scale blockchain based microgrid, in response to the rent-seeking behaviour of microgrid users and service providers, which leads to grid load overload, power surplus, and other issues, the impact of bribery attacks can be controlled to a certain extent through appropriate policy intervention and participant games, achieving grid load power balance.