业务
自由裁量权
面板数据
委托代理问题
代理(哲学)
社会比较理论
会计
公共经济学
经济
公司治理
财务
计量经济学
心理学
社会心理学
法学
政治学
认识论
哲学
标识
DOI:10.1080/1540496x.2023.2287492
摘要
CEO pay structure critically impacts a wide range of strategic choices, including corporate social irresponsibility (CSI), a pervasive and seriously damaging behavior. While the impact of CEO pay structure on CSI has received attention and focus, existing studies need to pay more attention to the potential role of CEO relative pay structure. Based on the behavioral agency theory, this study examines the impact of CEO underpayment and overpayment on CSI. Using panel data on listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019, we find that relative CEO underpayment is significantly positively correlated with CSI, and relative CEO overpayment is significantly negatively correlated with CSI. In addition, we find that industry-level managerial discretion strengthens the positive (negative) relationship between relative CEO underpayment (overpayment) and CSI.
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