Recruiting without‐car drivers through multiple sources: the impact on a ride‐sharing platform's driver surplus and consumer surplus

出租 程式化事实 经济盈余 共享经济 业务 采购 利润(经济学) 外部性 运输工程 经济 营销 计算机科学 微观经济学 工程类 万维网 宏观经济学 土木工程 福利 市场经济
作者
Qiang Lin,Jiaxin Zhai,Kangning Jin,Xiaogang Lin
出处
期刊:International Transactions in Operational Research [Wiley]
卷期号:32 (3): 1677-1711 被引量:7
标识
DOI:10.1111/itor.13366
摘要

Abstract Recently, ride‐sharing platforms have started to recruit not only with‐car drivers but also without‐car drivers. Without‐car drivers can directly rent cars from a ride‐sharing platform that operates its own fleets, which requires the platform to pay operating costs to manage the vehicles (self‐operated drivers) or rent cars from a car‐rental company that cooperates with the platform (rental drivers). This paper builds a stylized model to examine the impact of recruiting without‐car drivers on a platform's driver surplus, consumer surplus, and profit. We assume that a ride‐sharing platform first decides to recruit either with‐car drivers or both with‐ and without‐car drivers. Then, the platform sets a price charged to customers, a wage paid to drivers, and a rental fee charged to self‐operated drivers. Customers decide whether to order on a ride‐sharing platform based on the price and network externality term, while drivers choose to provide services according to the wage, rental fee charged by the platform or car‐rental company, and utilization rate. We find that when the platform recruits with‐car drivers (recruits with‐ and without‐car drivers), supply and demand are matched when the potential number of with‐car drivers is relatively small (large), while supply exceeds demand when the potential number of with‐car drivers is large (small). Moreover, when a ride‐sharing platform changes to recruit with‐ and without‐car drivers, the platform and customers always become better off, while drivers may not. Specifically, when the operating cost is relatively low or high (moderate), the drivers become better (worse) off.
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