斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
业务
信息共享
温室气体
环境经济学
端口(电路理论)
政府(语言学)
产业组织
经济
微观经济学
计算机科学
营销
电气工程
工程类
生物
万维网
哲学
语言学
生态学
作者
Jiaguo Liu,Yibing Lyu,Juanjuan Wu,Junjin Wang
标识
DOI:10.1080/13675567.2022.2115025
摘要
With the increasing pressure of global climate change, the government and enterprises are actively taking measures to accelerate emission reduction in the shipping industry. To analyse the optimal adoption strategies of carbon abatement technologies for enterprises in a turbulent environment under the cap-and-trade scheme, we construct the Stackelberg game model in the maritime supply chain and conduct a comparative analysis of profits and carbon emissions to explore the interaction between information sharing and technology adoption. The results show: (1) the impact of information sharing on profits varies under different technological conditions, and the optimal technology adoption will change with carbon price; (2) information sharing will not change total carbon emissions but significantly reduce wasted carbon emissions; (3) considering consumer's green preference, information sharing can benefit the port and the shipping company simultaneously, forming a win–win situation. This study guides maritime supply chain members in technology adoption under market uncertainty.
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