Efficient Delegation by an Informed Principal

作者
Thomas A. Gresik,Eric W. Wirths Bond
出处
期刊:RePEc: Research Papers in Economics - RePEc [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis]
摘要

Consider the case of a firm with private valuation information bargaining with a supplier over the price and quantity of a good. If the firm and the supplier bargain directly, the bargaining outcome may not yield a first-best outcome due to the presence of information rents. The question we examine in this paper is whether these direct bargaining inefficiencies can be eliminated if the firm delegates the authority to negotiate with the supplier to an agent. We model the agent as an independent profit center that contracts with the parent firm as well as the supplier. The delegation of decision-making to the agent can influence the interaction between the firm and the supplier by altering the information rents the agent can claim from the supplier. To identify the role of delegation, we focus instead on two games. Both games have a continuum of equilibria, which we compare to the set of incentive efficient equilibria of the initial no-delegation bargaining game. The first game involves partial delegation as the firm controls the release of its private information through a public transfer price charged to the agent. Because the relationship between the agent and the uninformed supplier is one of full information, the unique equilibrium quantity is first-best yet we show that the informed firm still earns an information rent. The second game involves full delegation as the agent controls both the quantity choice and the release of the firm's private information. We show that the full delegation game has a large set of equilibria that includes all of the incentive efficient equilibria of the bargaining game as well as inefficient equilibria. We believe our notion of partial delegation can be reflected in firms organized as profit centers and the management practice of category management

科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI
科研通是完全免费的文献互助平台,具备全网最快的应助速度,最高的求助完成率。 对每一个文献求助,科研通都将尽心尽力,给求助人一个满意的交代。
实时播报
挚友发布了新的文献求助10
刚刚
1秒前
胡晒发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
Nasser发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
璐璐完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
zjr完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
kwokai完成签到,获得积分10
1秒前
Camellia发布了新的文献求助10
1秒前
初景发布了新的文献求助10
2秒前
DW的应助被xia采纳,获得10
2秒前
2秒前
2秒前
热心市民小红花的应助被王一采纳,获得10
2秒前
勤勤豆完成签到,获得积分10
3秒前
称心言发布了新的文献求助10
3秒前
4秒前
hui发布了新的文献求助10
4秒前
vvvvv完成签到,获得积分10
4秒前
5秒前
6秒前
6秒前
天天向上的应助被bb采纳,获得10
6秒前
7秒前
打打的应助被醉熏的初之采纳,获得20
7秒前
ubless607的应助被CarryLJR采纳,获得10
7秒前
搜集达人的应助被yumi采纳,获得10
8秒前
8秒前
SciGPT的应助被dan1029采纳,获得10
8秒前
8秒前
大个的应助被犹豫的银耳汤采纳,获得10
8秒前
Juvenilesy的应助被腼腆的寻琴采纳,获得10
8秒前
甜美的秋凌完成签到,获得积分10
8秒前
Juvenilesy的应助被腼腆的寻琴采纳,获得10
8秒前
ccc关闭了ccc的文献求助
8秒前
9秒前
9秒前
9秒前
9秒前
10秒前
漂亮无极完成签到 ,获得积分10
10秒前
高分求助中
(应助此贴封号)【重要!!请各用户(尤其是新用户)详细阅读】【科研通的精品贴汇总】 10000
拉伸高分子熔体中缠结行为的模拟和小角中子散射研究 1700
奈特基础组织学:配套组织病理学(第4版)(Netter's Essential Histology With Correlated Histopathology) 800
John McDowells Bildungstheorie 800
八旗制度の研究 600
plantTFDB 508
Resource Recovery Handbook 500
热门求助领域 (近24小时)
化学 材料科学 医学 生物 纳米技术 计算机科学 工程类 有机化学 化学工程 生物化学 物理 复合材料 内科学 催化作用 光电子学 人工智能 细胞生物学 无机化学 物理化学 数学
热门帖子
关注 科研通微信公众号,转发送积分 8175707
求助须知:如何正确求助?哪些是违规求助? 9567353
关于积分的说明 21792214
捐赠科研通 7770334
什么是DOI,文献DOI怎么找? 3431908
关于科研通互助平台的介绍 2556260
邀请新用户注册赠送积分活动 2477417